

ARABIC LINGUISTIC TRADITION II:

pragmatics

Pierre Larcher

8.1 INTRODUCTION: FROM THE GRAMMATICAL TRADITION TO THE LINGUISTIC TRADITION

The idea that grammar is nothing more than one of the linguistic disciplines is found in the Arabic tradition itself. We can cite at least two works in evidence. The first is the *Miftāḥ al-‘ulūm* (“The key to the sciences”) by Sakkākī (d. 626/1229). This work is divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to morphology (*‘ilm al-ṣarf*), the second to syntax (*‘ilm al-naḥw*), the third to the “two sciences of meaning and of expression” (*‘ilmā al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*), or rhetoric (*Miftāḥ*, 3:25–27).

A little earlier, however, Sakkākī had presented syntax as having as its “complement” (*tamām*) rhetoric; the first part of rhetoric as having as its “complement” the “two sciences of definition and of argumentation” (*‘ilmā al-ḥadd wa-istidlāl*), in other words logic. Rhetoric in turn was presented as bipartite, to the extent that it is used and practiced in the two arts of prose (*nathr*) and versification (*naẓm*), as needing, for the latter, the “two sciences of prosody and of rhymes” (*‘ilmā al-‘arūḍ wa-l-qawāfī*), in other words poetics (*‘ilm al-shi‘r*). Sakkākī indicates that he deals with all of this because it is a matter “of several species of belles-lettres” (*‘iddat ‘anwā‘ al-‘adab*), “taking each one from the other” (*muta‘ākhidha*), in other words forming a coherent whole. He explicitly excludes from his structure, however, lexicography (*‘ilm al-lughā*) (*Miftāḥ*, 2:20–21; 3:1–12).

The contents of the *Miftāḥ* would thus be better described as a veritable encyclopedia of the sciences of language combining grammar, rhetoric, logic, and poetics, with each part presented as a binary structure: the phrase *‘ilmā l-ṣarf wa-naḥw* appears at 3:33–34; it is parallel, as seen above, to those Sakkākī uses for the other three disciplines.

There is no contradiction between these two perspectives. The tripartite presentation is foreshadowed by the quadripartite presentation, in the sense that a distinction is made by the latter between what might be called the basic core and the expansions. The basic core comprises grammar and rhetoric, because these are the only disciplines that have expansions. To be sure, rhetoric is presented as an expansion of one of the two parts of grammar, but, in turn, it has for expansions logic, for the first of its two parts, and poetics for its two parts. The complex relationships among the various parts of this whole can be represented as shown in Figure 8.1:




FIGURE 8.1 The science of language

The second work is the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406). As its name indicates, it is the “introduction” to his great work of history, the *Kitāb al-‘ibar* (Book of lessons), Book I of the tome. The *Muqaddima* itself is divided into six chapters (*bāb*), which are subdivided into sections (*faṣl*). The sixth chapter is a veritable encyclopedia of the sciences, which contains a section entitled *fi ‘ulūm al-lisān al-‘arabī* (On the sciences of the Arabic language no. 45) (*Muqaddima*, 1055–1070). Ibn Khaldūn enumerates four of them, in this order: grammar (*‘ilm al-naḥw*); the science of the lexicon (*‘ilm al-lughā*); rhetoric (*‘ilm al-bayān*); and the science of belles-lettres (*‘ilm al-‘adab*).

Comparison between the two works is very instructive. First, the two structures have two disciplines in common, grammar and rhetoric, even though the two authors use different terminologies. Sakkākī uses *naḥw* in opposition to *ṣarf* to refer specifically to syntax. In contrast, Ibn Khaldūn uses *naḥw* in the general sense of grammar. Likewise, Sakkākī uses *bayān* as the name of one of the two parts of rhetoric, while Ibn Khaldūn uses it to name the entirety. But the presence of these two disciplines within the two structures confirms that they did indeed constitute the “basic core” of the Arabic linguistic tradition.

Second, Sakkākī excludes from his structure the *‘ilm al-lughā* that Ibn Khaldūn, conversely, does include. Even though neither of the two authors gives reasons for his choice to include or exclude it, the reason can be inferred on the basis of a remarkable passage in the *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* (I:5) by the grammarian Raḍī al-dīn al-Astarābadhī (d. 688/1289) (Larcher 2000). There he defines the specific “objects” of the *‘ilm al-lughā*, the *‘ilm al-ṣarf* (*taṣrīf*, as

he calls it), and the *'ilm al-naḥw*. He does so through the concept of *wad'*, which is inherited from *falsafa* (Greek *thesis*, Latin *impositio*, modern “institution”) and which itself in the postclassical period will become the object of its own discipline, the *'ilm al-wad'* (Weiss 1976). For Astarābadhī, these objects were instituted either as “determinate expressions” (*'alfāz mu'ayyana*), which he describes as *samā'iyya* (lit. relating to *samā'* “hearing”), dealt with in the *'ilm al-lughā*, or a “general rule” (*qānūn kullī*), through which one knows *qiyāsiyya* expressions (lit. relating to *qiyās* or “measure”). If the latter term is translated as “regular,” then *samā'ī* will be “irregular.” Regular expressions can be simple (*mufradāt*) or complex (*murakkabāt*). Regular simple expressions and some regular complex expressions (e.g. the relative adjective or the imperfect verb) relate to the *'ilm al-taṣrīf*: the relative adjective and the imperfect verb are formally complex, comprising a stem with a suffix in the first case and a prefix in the second, but do not function any the less as units. The other regular complex expressions (phrases and sentences) relate to the *'ilm al-naḥw*. All this can easily be translated into contemporary linguistic terms. A language on the whole comprises a grammar on the one hand and a lexicon on the other. Grammar in turn includes a phonology, a morphology (*ṣarf/taṣrīf* including both phonology and morphology), and a syntax. The *ṣarf/taṣrīf* and the *naḥw* deal with the entirety of grammar, so it is only logical that a specific component deals with the lexicon. But the lexicon of a language consists of two parts: a regular part and an irregular part. Of course the regular part of the lexicon – that is, the rules of formation and interpretation of words – is in fact already treated in the *ṣarf* and, more specifically, the *ishtiqaq* (“derivation”). Thus, what is left over is the irregular part of the lexicon, which is likely to interest the lexicographer but not someone so concerned about systematization as Sakkākī.

Third and last, Sakkākī considers the four disciplines he deals with to relate to an entirety that is the *'adab* (*Miftāh*, 3:12), though Ibn Khaldūn, conversely, considers the *'adab* to be a part of the entirety! This is explained by the difference in perspective of the two authors. Sakkākī is known as the systematizer of rhetoric (Smyth 1995). This is no accident. Rhetoric is central in his structure; it is the only discipline that is an expansion of another discipline, grammar, and that has, with logic and poetics, its own expansions. By including the various disciplines he deals with in an entirety relating to *'adab*, Sakkākī marks out his perspective as essentially literary. Ibn Khaldūn's is quite different. He is known as a historian, but his profession was magistrate (*qāḍī*). He displays this perspective immediately after naming the four “pillars” (*'arkān*) of the “sciences of the Arabic language” (*Muqaddima*, 1055):

Knowledge of them all is necessary for religious scholars, since the source of all religious laws is the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, which are in Arabic. Their transmitters, the men

around Muḥammad and the men of the second generation, were Arabs. Their difficulties are to be explained from the language they used. Thus, those who want to be religious scholars must know the sciences connected with the Arabic language. (trans. Rosenthal, abr. ed. 433)

ومعرفتها ضرورية على أهل الشريعة إذ مأخذ الأحكام الشرعية كلها من الكتاب والسنة وهي بلغة العرب ونقلتها من الصحابة والتابعين عرب وشرح مشكلاتها من لغتهم فلا بد من معرفة العلوم المتعلقة بهذا اللسان لمن أراد علم الشريعة .

Ibn Khaldūn's perspective is clearly hermeneutic. Comparing the two works will thus remind us that the Arabic linguistic tradition has two aspects: one literary and the other hermeneutic. On its hermeneutical side, it thus intersects with the religious (i.e. theologico-juridical) sciences (*fiqh*, *'uṣūl al-fiqh*, *tafsīr*, *kalām*).

This chapter deals essentially with two topics:

1) Rhetoric, as one of the two *sectors* of the basic core of the Arabic linguistic tradition (for overviews, see Heinrichs 1987, 1998; Halldén 2006; Larcher 2009). Since the tradition was not definitively constructed until the postclassical period, I use the *Talkhīṣ* of Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338), the most famous “epitome” of the rhetorical part of the *Miftāḥ* of Sakkākī, which itself is based on the two works of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078), *Asrār al-‘arabiyya* and *Dalā’il al-I’jāz*. The *Talkhīṣ* owes its fame to the fact that it is a textbook (Smyth 1993), the object of many commentaries and supercommentaries, some of them collected in the *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ* and widely used, until quite recently, in teaching and also used by Western scholars (Mehren 1853; Jenssen 1998).

2) Given the central nature of rhetoric, its *intersections* with the other sectors of this tradition: one of them linguistics proper (i.e., grammar), the others not linguistics proper (i.e., the theologico-juridical sciences).

8.2. RHETORIC

8.2.1. Structural and terminological uncertainty

Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ* calls rhetoric *'ilm al-balāgha* and divides it into three parts: *'ilm al-ma‘ānī*, *'ilm al-bayān*, and *'ilm al-badī‘*. After briefly presenting the subject of each, he concludes (*Talkhīṣ*, 36–37): “but many call the entirety *'ilm al-bayān*, whereas some call the first *'ilm al-ma‘ānī* and the other two *'ilm al-bayān* and all three *'ilm al-badī‘*” (وكثير يسمي (الجميع علم البيان وبعضهم يسمي الأول علم المعاني والآخرين علم البيان والثلاثة علم البديع). The first set of terms is, for example, that of Ibn Khaldūn, who gives the name *'ilm al-bayān* to both the entirety and the second part of the entirety, and *'ilm al-balāgha* to the first part. It is also Ḍiyā’ al-dīn Ibn al-Athīr's (d. 637/1239). His work, *al-Mathal al-sā‘ir*, gives the name *'ilm al-bayān* to the

entirety, dividing the content into an “introduction” and two “discourses” (*maqāla*), dealing, respectively, with “technique relating to the *lafẓ*” (*ṣinā‘a lafẓiyya*) and with “technique relating to the meaning” (*ṣinā‘a ma‘nawiyya*). The second set of terms is Sakkākī’s (*‘ilmā al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*), although he does not give a name to the entirety. I do not know whether the name *‘ilm al-badī‘* was ever given to the entirety. But, if it was, this might be compared with Ibn Khaldūn’s remark that some rhetoricians, basically Maghrebi, favored this part, his example being the *‘Umda* of Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1063–4) (*Muqaddima*, 1068). I will follow the division and terminology of Qazwīnī, always keeping in mind the structural and terminological uncertainties of the field in the Arabic tradition.

8.2.2. *‘Ilm al-ma‘ānī*

The *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* or “science of meanings” in its very name identifies itself as a *semantics*. In the definition given of it, however, the word “*ma‘nā*”, of which *ma‘ānī* is the plural, does not appear, but, rather the word paired with it in the Arabic tradition (*Talkhīṣ*, 37): “it is a science by which the states of Arabic expression become known, appropriate to the needs of the situation” (وهو علم يعرف به أحوال اللفظ العربي التي بها تطابق مقتضى الحال). Other than *lafẓ*, the important word here is *ḥāl*, which appears twice, once in the singular, once in the plural. Such a definition posits the existence of a *correlation* between the *variation* (the “states”) in the expression and the *situation* (the “state”). It is a semantics, the point of view adopted being *semasiological* (i.e., going from the expression to the *ma‘nā*), and, more specifically, a *contextual* semantics.

Further elements of an answer can be drawn from the examination of the sections that make up the *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and the justification for this division (*Talkhīṣ*, 37–38). It is divided into eight sections: (I) states of the assertive predication; (II) states of the “support”; (III) states of the “supported” (lit., “that which is leaned”); (IV) states of the complements of the verb; (V) restriction; (VI) performative; (VII) conjunction and disjunction; and (VIII) concision, prolixity, and equilibrium. This division is justified by a set of six propositions.

The first proposition is as follows: “The utterance, in fact, is either statement or performative, because if its relationship has a referent, to which it is appropriate or not, it is a statement and, if not, a performative.”

الكلام اما خبر أو انشاء لأنه ان كان لنسبته خارج تطابقه او لا تطابقه فخير والا فانشاء

This first proposition justifies sections I and VI and suggests that this semantics is primarily a semantics of the utterance. It repeats in fact the classification of utterances into *khābar* and

'*inshā'* (Larcher, 1980, 1991), which was established conclusively in the 7th/13th century but which represents the outcome of a long tradition, the *ma'ānī al-kalām* ("meanings of the utterance"), to use the title of a chapter of Ibn Fāris' *Ṣāhibī* (d. 395/1004) (Frank 1981; Buburuzan 1995; Versteegh 2004). If the *khābar* is defined positively as a referential utterance, in other words an assertion, the '*inshā'* is here defined simply in a negative way, as a nonreferential utterance. But its name (lit. "creation") and examination of the sources show that it can be defined positively as a self-referential utterance, identifiable both by extension and by intension, with Austin's (1962) category of performative (vs. constative). The '*inshā'* is at first added to a preexisting classification of utterances into *khābar* "statement" and *ṭalab* "request, demand" (= Fr. "jussion" and related adjective "jussive") designating only juridical performatives (*siyagh al-'uqūd wa-l-fusūkh* "contractual and renunciative formulas"). Then, at a later time, *ṭalab* was subsumed under '*inshā'*. A trace of this history remains in the commentators on Sakkakī. Sakkakī knows only a classification of utterances into *khābar* and *ṭalab*. His commentators adopt the new classification into *khābar* and '*inshā'* but subdivide the latter into *ṭalabī* "requesting, demanding" and *ghayr ṭalabī* "not requesting, demanding". If the '*inshā' ṭalabī* has the same extension as Sakkakī's *ṭalab*, the '*inshā' ghayr ṭalabī* includes, along with the juridical performatives, sometimes called '*īqā'ī* "operatives", all utterances that are neither assertions nor requests, such as, for example, the exclamations (see Section 8.3.5 below).

The second proposition is: "The statement requires a support, a supported, and a predication."

والخبر لا بد له من مسند اليه ومسند واسناد

This alludes to the fact that every utterance, whether statement or not, is a clause (*jumla*) and every clause a set (literal meaning of the word *jumla* in Arabic) of two elements (*juz'*) linked by a relationship (*nisba*) of predication ('*isnād*). Because '*isnād* is the *maṣdar* of a verb '*asnada* construed with two objects, a direct one and an indirect one introduced by the preposition '*ilā*, these two elements are called in Arabic *musnad* and *musnad 'ilayhi* and should logically be called predicate and subject. These two terms, however, hardly suit the verb (*fi'l*) and the subject of the verb (*fā'il*), corresponding to *musnad* and *musnad 'ilayhi*, of the verbal clause, which is a *linked* clause, in the sense of the Swiss linguist Charles Bally ((1865–1947) (Bally 1965)), where the verb governs its arguments. They are even less appropriate for the terms "topic" (*mubtada'*) and "comment" (*khābar*), respectively, the *musnad 'ilayhi* and *musnad* of the nominal clause, which is a *segmented* clause, in the sense of Bally (ibid.). The verb '*asnada* literally means "to lean s.t. on ('*ilā*)"; the derived passive participles *musnad* "supported" and *musnad 'ilayhi* "leaned on", designating the two obligatory parts of a predication, which I will translate as "supported" and "support"

(Guillaume 1986, Larcher 2000). This second proposition justifies II and III and shows that this semantics concerns not only the utterance, but also its constituents, in their major species.

The third proposition states: “The supported can have complements, if it is a verb or an element having the meaning of one.”

والمسند قد يكون له معلقات اذا كان فعلا او في معناه

This proposition justifies IV and shows that this semantics concerns the minor as well as the major constituents.

The fourth proposition is as follows: “Each of the two relationships, predicative and verbal complements, can be made with or without restriction.”

وكل من الاسناد والتعلق اما بقصر او غير قصر

This justifies V. Even though the restriction is presented as bearing on the constituents, whether major or minor, one finds here no less the utterance and even the semantically complex utterance.

The fifth proposition states: “Every clause is connected to another, whether coordinated with it or not.”

وكل جملة قرنت بأخرى اما معطوفة عليها او غير معطوفة

This proposition justifies section VII and shows that this semantics also goes beyond the utterance, concerning the way one clause links with another, in other words the formally complex utterance or discourse.

The sixth proposition is as follows: “The efficient utterance either considerably exceeds what is fundamentally intended, or else not.”

والكلام البليغ اما زائد على أصل المراد لفائدة أو غير زائد

If it is too much, there is “prolixity” (*’iṭnāb*); if there is too little, there is “concision” (*’tjāz*). If there is no excess, it is “equilibrium” (*musāwāt*). In this sixth and last proposition, which justifies section VIII, the term *balīgh* appears. This is the adjective corresponding to the verb *baluḡha*, whose verbal noun, *balāḡha*, is, within the field of *’ilm*, the term for rhetoric in Qazwīnī. *Baluḡha* perhaps understood as the stative-resultative voice of a verb of which *balāḡha* “arrive, reach” is the active voice. A *balīgh* discourse is thus a discourse that has achieved its purpose; in other words, it is efficient. The *balāḡha* presupposes *faṣāḡha*, but not vice versa. *Faṣāḡha* is the verbal noun of the stative verb *faṣuḡha*, to which the adjective *faṣīḡh*

corresponds. The elative *'afṣaḥ* that appears in the Quran (28:34) clearly designates the *faṣāḥa* as Aaron's fluency of speech as opposed to Moses' speech impediment. Something of the Quranic usage remains in rhetoric, where the term might be translated as "eloquence." Before postclassical rhetoric finally got rid of the two terms, *faṣāḥa* also appears in the titles of works of rhetoric, the most famous being the *Sirr al-faṣāḥa* of al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074). Outside of rhetoric, *faṣāḥa* can be used in the sense of "grammatical correctness", focusing on the matter of case and mood suffixes (*'i rāb*) (on *balāgha* and *faṣāḥa*, see Ghersetti 1998).

While centering on the utterance, this semantics sometimes deals with sub-utterance elements, taking an interest in its constituents, both major and minor, and sometimes goes beyond it, taking an interest in the connection of utterances among themselves. It is thus not possible to find in the rank of the expression (i.e., the utterance) the characteristics of this semantics.

The following sections go into more detail.

8.2.2.1. *The Khabar*

This section begins with a distinction between two uses of the statement: *fā'idat al-khabar* ("information provided by a statement"); and *lāzim fā'idat al-khabar* ("what it implies"). The first occurs when a speaker (*al-mukhbir*) wants to make the hearer know about a state of affairs (*al-ḥukm*), and the second happens when the speaker wants to make the hearer aware of what the speaker knows (*Talkhīṣ*, 40–41). Qazwīnī, unfortunately, gives no examples. Sakkākī (*Miftāḥ*, 72) gives, as an example of the first *Zaydun 'ālimun* ("Zayd is a scholar"), when it is said to someone who was not aware of the fact, and, as an example of the second, *qad hafīẓta al-Tawrāh* ("you know the Bible by heart"), when it is said to someone who knows the Bible by heart.

It is followed (*Talkhīṣ*, 41–42) by a second distinction, so famous that in Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddima*, 1065) it becomes one of the symbols of the *'ilm al-ma'ānī*. This is a distinction of three types of statements: *ibtidā'ī* (lit. "initial"); *ṭalabī* (lit. "requesting, demanding"); and *'inkārī* (lit. "denying"). The first is addressed to someone who does not have an idea (*khālī al-dhihn*, lit. "empty mind") of the content of the statement. Its name comes from the fact that, purely informative, it is found at the beginning of the discourse. The second is addressed to someone with an attitude of hesitation or questioning with respect to the content. The last is addressed to someone with an attitude of denial with respect to the content. They thus take their names from what constitute *reactions* (Simon, 1993) to the attitude of the hearer and can take place only in dialogue. Ibn Khaldūn gives grammatical examples: *Zaydun qā'imun* ("Zayd is standing") for the first; *'inna Zaydan qā'imun* ("Yes, Zayd is standing") for the second; *'inna Zaydan la-qā'imun* ("Yes, Zayd really is standing") for the third.

Simply comparing these two paragraphs allows us to further our understanding of what *'ilm al-ma'ānī* is. In the first case, the meaning of the statement depends not only on the intention (*qaṣd*) of the speaker, as Qazwīnī has it, but also on what the hearer does or does not know, as noted by Sakkākī. In other words, the *calculation* of the meaning of the utterance depends narrowly on the situation of utterance and, more specifically, on the participants. This alone suffices to call this semantics a *pragmatics*, in the sense of the American semiotician Charles Morris (1901–1979). In the second case, the calculation of the meaning is no less pragmatic in nature, but it relies on objective markers that this situation of utterance leaves in the utterance: the reinforcement *'inna* in the second example; and the reinforcements *'inna* and *la-* in the third.

It is this last case that confirms the definition given of *'ilm al-ma'ānī*, a variation in the expression as a function of the situation of utterance, and explains the interpretation that has been given of *ma'ānī* as *ma'ānī al-naḥw*: a “semantics of syntax” (*EP*, s.v. *al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*). The expression *ma'ānī al-naḥw* appears elsewhere, if not in the *Talkhīṣ*, at least in the other epitome of the *Miftāḥ* made by Qazwīnī, the *'Idāḥ* (in *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, vol. 1: 132). It originated in the *Dalā'il* of Jurjānī (Heinrichs, 1987, Ghersetti 2002). It suffices to read Qazwīnī further to see that this interpretation is reductive. He gives not a grammarian's example, but a Quranic one (36:14–16), that of the two envoys (identified by the Islamic tradition as the apostles) to the inhabitants of a city (identified as Antioch). After initially being treated as liars, they said, reinforced by a third apostle: *'innā 'ilaykum mursalūn* “Yes, to you we have been sent” and, after being treated a second time as liars, they said: *rabbunā ya 'lamu 'innā 'ilaykum la-mursalūn* “Our Lord knows it: yes, to you we have indeed been sent.” As a result, Qazwīnī believes that the “reinforcement” (*taqwīya*) of the utterance, while it is “a good thing” (*ḥasuna*) in the case of *khābar ṭalabī*, is “obligatory” (*wajaba*) only in the case of *khābar 'inkārī*. The single and double reinforcements of the utterance do not make the difference here between *khābar ṭalabī* and *khābar 'inkārī*, but between two *retorts*, to a first and a second *denial*.

Thus, a one to one relationship cannot be established between interpretation of the utterance and presence or absence of markers in the utterance, since these can be optional. No less, moreover, can it be established that it is always possible to give the hearer a role that is not his, as in Quran 11:37 and 23:27 *lā tukhāṭibnī fī lladhīna zalamū 'innahum muḥraqūn* (“Do not speak to me of those who are unjust: they will be swallowed up”): here *'inna* is not a reponse to an actual question of the hearer's, but anticipates and forestalls a possible question on his part (“you will ask me: *what* of the unjust? I reply to you, ...”). Likewise, dealing with the first distinction, the speaker can perfectly do as if the hearer, knowing *p* (the statement) and knowing that the speaker knows it, does not know the two things, for example by saying to someone who is not praying *al-ṣalāt wājiba* (“prayer is obligatory”): it is then a third meaning that is engendered, of recall and even recall in order (*Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, vol. 1:199).

The term “calculate,” emphasized above, is essential because it can be formalized. One would then have, in the case of the first distinction: if speaker A says to hearer B p and that B does not know p , then A causes B to know p ; if A says to B p and that B knows p , then A causes B to know not p , but that *he* knows p ; if A says to B p and that B knows both p and that A knows p , then A *reminds* B of p .

8.2.2.2. The 'inshā'

It is a pragmatic calculation of this type that is found in the chapter on the 'inshā'. Qazwīnī treats under this name what Sakkakī treats under *ṭalab*. Like Sakkakī, he subsumes five species under it. But, unlike Sakkakī, he does not take the trouble to show how these five species derive from a single type. This derivation, which has been studied by Moutaouakil (1982, 1990), is basically logical, in both form (Porphyrian tree) and vocabulary. A request requires an object (*maṭlūb*) that does not exist at the moment of the request (*ghayr ḥāṣil waqt al-ṭalab*). This object is realizable ('*imkān al-ḥuṣūl*) or not. If it is not, it is a wish (*tamannī*) (on which see now Zysow 2008). If it is, it is “in the mind” (*fī l-dhihn*) or “in the external world” (*fī l-khārij*). In the first case, it is interrogation (*istifhām*). In the second, it is a matter of “representation” (*mutaṣawwar*), whether negative (*intifā'*) or positive (*thubūt*). In the first case, it is an interdiction (*nahy*), e.g. *lā taḥarrak* (“do not move”), and in the second it is an order ('*amr*), e.g., *qum* (“get up”) and a vocative (*nidā'*), e.g., *yā Zaydu* (“Zayd!”).

On the other hand, the result is typically pragmatic. For each of these species “expressions” are “instituted,” for example *layta* for the wish, *hal* and 'a for interrogation, etc. But all “can be used in another sense than their own” (*qad yusta 'mal fī ghayr ma 'nāhu*). Each of the five paragraphs of this chapter, then, studies how, beginning with these “primary” ('*aṣliyya*) meanings, a certain number of “secondary” (*far 'iyya*) meanings “are engendered” (*yatawallad*) situationally. Just one example (*Talkhīṣ*, 170–171): for the interdiction only one particle exists, the *lā* governing the apocopated form, the interdiction being the counterpart of the order, as regards the superiority [of the speaker over the hearer] (*isti 'lā'*). But it can be used for other things than “to require not to do” (*ṭalab al-kaff 'aw al-tark*), for example threat (*tahdīd*), thus when one says to a slave who does not obey: “Do not obey me!” (*lā tamtathil 'amrī*, lit. “do not conform to my order”). As specified by Sakkakī (*Miftāḥ*, 132), in this context, “It cannot be a matter of a requirement of disobedience, if such a thing existed: it is oriented toward something that does not exist..., and what finds itself engendered, aside from itself, is a threat” (امتنع طلب ترك الامتثال لكونه حاصلًا وتوجه الى غير حاصل ... وتولد منه التهديد) (on this concept of “engendering,” Firănescu 2011).

It does no harm to recognize here what Searle (1975) calls an “illocutionary derivation.” Similarly, we can recognize more generally in the '*ilm al-mā 'ānī* what Berrendonner (1981) calls a “semantics in Y”: the meaning here appears in fact as the *result*, symbolized by the

stem of the Y, of a calculation operating on two components, symbolized by the arms of the Y, one linguistic (the “institution”) and the other “rhetorical” (the “use”).

8.2.2.3. *The qaṣr or restriction: The semantically complex utterance*

In this section, Qazwīnī studies the utterances that might be called “restrictive” and the various syntactic mechanisms put into effect to express restrictiveness: negation and exception (*naft wa-istithnā*), coordination (*ʿatf*), preposing (*taqdīm*), *ʿinnamā*.... On the semantic level, the classification he proposes “crosses” two distinctions. One is logical. It can either restrict the subject (*mawṣūf*) to the attribute (*ṣifa*), e.g. *mā Zaydun ʿillā kātibun* (“Zayd is nothing but a prose writer,” “Zayd is only a prose writer”), or the attribute to the subject, e.g. *mā fi l-dāri ʿillā Zaydun* (“There is only Zayd in the house,” “Only Zayd is in the house”). The other is pragmatic. Here the restriction is called “singularization” (*ʿifrād*), “inversion” (*qalb*), or “specification” (*taʿyīn*), according to the belief of the hearer to which it reacts. Thus the first utterance is addressed to someone who believes that Zayd is both (*sharika*) prose writer and poet. But the utterance *Zaydun qāʿimun lā qāʿidun* (“Zayd is standing, not seated”), with the syntactic process of coordination (*ʿatf*), is addressed to someone who believes either the opposite (i.e. “Zaid is seated”) or one or the other (i.e. “Zayd is seated or standing”), etc.

8.2.2.4. *Al-waṣl wa-l-faṣl, or conjunction and disjunction: The formally complex utterance*

“Conjunction” and “disjunction” are the two types of “connection” of one clause to another. “Conjunction” is defined as the coordination (*ʿatf*) of the first to the second and “disjunction” as its absence. This last thus corresponds to what is called, in our tradition, asyndesis or parataxis. Generally speaking, what rules “conjunction,” basically, is the semantic and formal homogeneity of “conjoined” utterances, and “disjunction” the semantic and/or formal heterogeneity of “disjoint” utterances. Turning to the details, the first opposition encountered is *khobar/inshāʿ*. They cannot in fact be coordinated with each other, e.g. *māta fulānun raḥima-hu llāhu*: even if the two utterances are formally declaratives, only the first of them is semantically one (“So-and-so is dead”), the second being in fact semantically optative (“May Allah take pity on him!”). But phenomena are also found that are typically “enunciative,” e.g., Quran 2:14–15 (وإذا خلوا الى شياطينهم قالوا ان معكم انما نحن مستهزون بهم / الله يستهزئ بهم), where the disjunction of *Allah yastahziʿu bihim* is justified by the fact that “it does not belong to what they say” (*laysa min maqūlihim*), in other words by the change of utterer. Especially remarkable is the case of “disjunction” called “resumption” (*istiʿnāf*), because the second

¹ *Taqdīm* and *taʿkhīr* (“postposing”) – that is, order, pragmatically conditioned, of the constituents of the clause – treated only scatteredly in the *Talkhīṣ*. Conversely, it occupies a special section in the *Dalāʿil* (p. 83f.) of Jurjānī, studied by Owens (1988). Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddima*, p. 1065) includes it as the first theme of his *ʿilm al-balāgha* (= *ʿilm al-maʿānī*).

clause is to be understood as a response (*jawāb*) to an implicit question (*su'āl*) suggested by the first, as in the following verse: *qāla lī kayfa 'anta qultu 'alīlū / sarahrūn dā'imun wa-ḥuznun ṭawīlū* (“‘How are you?’ he asked me. ‘Unwell! Permanent insomnia and prolonged melancholy!’ I replied”); *saharūn dā'imun wa-ḥuznu ṭawīlū* responds in fact to a question like *mā bāluka 'alīlan* (“What maladies do you have?”) or else *mā sababu 'illatika* (“What is the cause of your malady?”). We see, from these few examples, that if “conjunction” is defined as a *syntactic* coordination, then “disjunction” could be interpreted as a *semantic* coordination, in the sense of Bally (1965): the two disjoint clauses are in the semantic relation of topic to comment and the comment implicitly makes reference to the topic: “He is dead (and, because he is dead,) may Allah take pity on him!”, “(They say that they do nothing but mock, but) it is Allah who mocks them; [I am] sick; (you are going to ask me from what): from permanent insomnia and prolonged melancholy.”

8.2.3. The *ilm al-bayān*

If the *ilm al-ma'ānī* designates itself by its very name as a semantics, the *ilm al-bayān* appears from the definition given by Qazwīnī to be a *stylistics* (*Talkhis*, 235–236): “It is a science by which is recognized the communication of one and the same intention by different means in what concerns the clarity of its meaning” (وهو علم يعرف به إيراد المعنى الواحد بطرق مختلفة) (في وضوح الدلالة عليه).

In the synchrony of postclassical rhetoric, the *ilm al-bayān* represents a point of view simultaneously complementary to and symmetrical with that of the *ilm al-ma'ānī*: a point of view that can be called *onomasiological*, in that it goes from *ma'nā* to *lafẓ*. But in the diachrony of the discipline, it represents in fact an older point of view. The term *bayān*, which has Quranic resonances, is formally the *maṣḍar* of the verb *bāna–yabīnu* “to be distinct.” It appears in the title of the founding work of Arabic rhetoric, the *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn* (“to be and to make distinct”) of al-Jāhīz (d. 255/868) (Montgomery 2006). And we have seen *ilm al-bayān* competing with *ilm al-balāgha* as the name of the entire discipline.

These “means” are not beyond counting. To count them, Qazwīnī (*Talkhīṣ*, 236–238) uses the concept, which we have already met, of *wadʿ* (“institution”), which governs the relation of meaning (*dalāla 'alā ma'nā*), *lafẓ* and *ma'nā* being called, under this relationship, *al-mawḍūʿ* (“that which is instituted”) and *al-mawḍūʿ lahu* (“that for which one institutes it”). This meaning is precisely “institutional” (*wadʿiyya*), when the expression signifies “the entirety of that for which it is instituted” (*tamām mā wuḍiʿa lahu*). It is also called in this case “adequacy” (*muṭābaqa*). It is “logical” (*'aqliyya*) when the expression does mean either a “part” (*juz'uhu*) of that for which it is instituted or something “external” (*khārij 'anhu*). The

first case is called *taḍammun* (“comprehensiveness,” “inclusion”) and the second *iltizām* (“implication”). It is only this last that interests the rhetorician. Linguistically speaking, one would say *implicit* meaning, but the linguistic term should not make us forget its logical origin (Lat. *implicitus* < *implicare*). The “expression by which one aims at that which implies that for which it is instituted” (*al-laḥẓ al-murād bihi lāzim mā wuḍi‘a lahu*), in other words its implicit meaning (and not its explicit one), is called *majāz* if there is a “connection” (*qarīna*) indicating that the explicit meaning is not aimed at, and, if not, *kināya* (“metonymy”): this is in fact defined (*Talkhīṣ*, 337) as “the expression by which one aims at that which implies its meaning, with the possibility of aiming at this at the same time” (الكناية لفظ أريد به لازم معناه مع (جواز ارادته معه). Finally, the *majāz* can be based on a comparison (*tashbīh*, on which see especially Smyth 1992). Hence the three sections of the *‘ilm al-bayān* : (1) *tashbīh*; (2) *ḥaqīqa wa-majāz*; (3) *kināya*.

Here we cannot go into detail on these three sections and must be satisfied with a few remarks. First, *majāz* and *ḥaqīqa* do not at all refer, as has often been said, to the literal meaning or proper sense and the figurative meaning, but in fact to the expression used in its literal meaning and to the expression used in its figurative meaning. This confirms the onomasiological point of view (on this contrast, see Heinrichs 1984). Second, to the extent that *majāz* is opposed to *kināya*, it refers not to every figurative expression, but, more specifically, to metaphorical expression. Third, because the *majāz* includes comparison, it refers in fact, for the most part, to figurative expression based on what there is in common between metaphor and comparison, namely, resemblance (*mushābaha*). As in our tradition, metaphor is seen as a truncated comparison, see Qazwīnī, citing Sakkakī (*Talkhīṣ*, 330): “He divided the lexical *majāz* into metaphor and other and defined metaphor as the fact of mentioning one of the two terms of the comparison, aiming, by it, at the other” (وقسم المجاز (اللغوي الى الاستعارة وغيرها وعرف الاستعارة بأن تذكر أحد طرفي التشبيه وتريد به الآخر).

Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddima*, 1065–1066), for his part, holds resolutely to two “means,” *isti‘āra* and *kināya*, which he differentiates logically. He presents the first as a passage from the “antecedent” (*malzūm*) to the “consequent” (*lāzim*), e.g. *Zaydun ‘asadun* (“Zayd is a lion”: if Zayd is a lion, then he is courageous), and the second as a passage from the consequent to the antecedent, e.g. *Zaydun kathīru ramādi l-quḍūr* (“Zayd has many ashes under his pots”: if Zayd has many ashes under his pots, it is because he is very hospitable). This last example is known from Qazwīnī (*Talkhīṣ*, 340–341), who includes it in the metonymy of one *ṣifa* (attribute) for another, but “distant” (*ba‘īda*), because it happens “through an intermediary” (*bi-wāsiṭa*). Qazwīnī reconstructs the chain of inferences leading from one to the other: “many ashes” (*kathīr al-ramād*), thus “much wood burned under the pots” (*kathra ‘iḥrāq al-ḥaṭab taḥt al-quḍūr*), thus “many cooked dishes” (*kathrat al-ṭabā’ikh*), thus “many eaters” (*kathrat al-‘akala*), thus “many hosts” (*kathrat al-ḍīfān*). The logical criterion is known from Sakkakī

(*Miftāḥ*, 170) and, following him, Qazwīnī, but criticized by the latter, on the grounds that one cannot be transferred from the consequent, because there is no antecedent!

Whatever criterion is employed, the Arab rhetoricians could not get very close to the idea because they had, at base, only two fundamental figures: metaphor and metonymy. In modern Western linguistics, Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) did. As we know, he proposed a correlation between metaphor and similarity, metonymy and contiguity, and, as a result, distributed them on the axes, respectively paradigmatic and syntagmatic, of language (Jakobson, 1956).

One last word: Qazwīnī here limits *majāz* to *majāz lughawī* (“lexical”). But Sakkākī (*Miftāḥ*, 166f.) treats both in the *‘ilm al-bayān* of the *majāz ‘aqlī* (“logical”). The latter concerns the utterance, notably when its two terms are metaphorical, e.g. *‘aḥyā l-‘arḍa shabābu l-zamāni* “The youth of time [= spring] has revived the earth [= has produced vegetation].” Qazwīnī is not unaware of this, but he treats it in the *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, section I (*Talkhīṣ*, 45f.). This suggests that the rank of the expression ends up competing with the point of view. Ultimately, rhetoric appears as nothing but a contextual semantics: of the utterance and its constituents in the context of the discourse for the *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, of the word in the context of the clause for the *‘ilm al-bayān*.

8.2.4. The *‘ilm al-badī‘*

The *‘ilm al-badī‘* comes simultaneously from very close and very far.

From very close, because, as the third part of rhetoric, it is a recent innovation, due to Badr al-dīn Ibn Mālik (d. 686/1287), the son of the famous grammarian Ibn Mālik (d. 642/1274), in his work on rhetoric called *al-Miṣbāḥ*. For Sakkākī, it is not yet anything but a simple ornamental tailpiece to *‘ilm al-bayān*. Qazwīnī gives the following definition (*Talkhīṣ*, 347): “It is a science through which the manners of embellishing discourse become known, after observing the adequacy [of the expression for what the situation requires] and the semantic clarity” (وهو علم يعرف به وجوه تحسين الكلام بعد رعاية المتابعة ووضوح الدلالة). In this definition not only are the very words of Sakkākī found, but also the memory of a tailpiece (“after”) is preserved, even if, due to the fact of its assumption to the rank of part, a tailpiece no longer to the *‘ilm al-bayān*, but to the *‘ilmā al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*.

And from very far, because the term appears in one of the first works of rhetoric that we have, the *Kitāb al-badī‘* of the poet (and caliph for a day) Ibn al-Mu‘tazz (d. 296/808), who was assassinated the very day of his enthronement. The *Kitāb al-badī‘* or book of the “new [style]” takes its name from its polemical aim, namely to show that the style of the poets called “modern” (*muḥdathūn*), such as Bashshār b. Burd (d. 167 or 168/784–5), Muslim b. al-Walīd (d. 208/823), or Abū Nuwās (d. between 198/813 and 200/815), is not so very “new”

and that none of its features was not anticipated in the Quran, the traditions of Muḥammad and his companions, and old poetry. As for the rest, the *Kitāb al-badīʿ* presents itself as a simple catalogue of figures, five basic ones, including metaphor (*istiʿāra*), to which Ibn al-Muʿtazz adds twelve “ornaments” (*maḥāsīn*) of discourse, in prose (*kalām*) or poetry (*shīʿr*), or a total of seventeen figures.

Through the centuries, the *ʿilm al-badīʿ* remained what it had been since the beginning: a *tropology*. The resemblance of the *ʿilm al-badīʿ* to what in our own tradition is called “rhetoric restricted to figures” is accentuated by the fact that Qazwīnī, following Sakkākī, divides them into two types (*ḍarbān*): “semantic” (*maʿnawī*) and “formal” (*lafzī*). In this division the similarity must be recognized to what we call in our tradition “figures of thought” and “figures of expression.” Of the 37 figures named by Qazwīnī, 30 belong to the first type versus 7 to the second. It will suffice here to present the first of each of the two types of figures. The *ṭibāq* is defined (*Talkhīṣ*, 348) as “the union of two contraries, that is, of two opposed meanings, in the clause” (*al-jamʿ bayna mutaḍāddayn ʿay maʿnawayni mutaḡābilayni fī al-jumla*), for example *taḥsubuhum ʿayqāzan wa-hum ruqūd* (“you believe them awake, even though they are abed”). It is antithesis. The *jinās* (*Talkhīṣ*, 388) is defined as the “formal resemblance of two terms” (*tashābuhumā fī al-lafz*). According to their degree of proximity, this figure varies from simple paronomasia to repetition pure and simple.

8.2.5. *Balāgha* vs. *khaṭāba*

ʿilm al-balāgha is usually translated as “rhetoric.” This leads to the question of its relationship with what we call “rhetoric” in our own tradition. The question is not empty. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was translated into Arabic under the name *al-khaṭāba*. “Rhetoric” reveals itself etymologically to be an “[art] of oratory” (*rhetorikè technè*). *Khaṭāba* is the *maṣḍar* of the verb *khaṭaba* “to be eloquent” (*khaṭīb*). The eloquent man having been chosen as spokesman of his tribe, the same word designates, by metonymy, the orator, and *khaṭaba* itself passes from the quality (eloquence) to the activity (office of *khaṭīb*), whence the reading **khiṭāba*.

Genetically, there is essentially no relationship between *ʿilm al-balāgha* and Aristotelian rhetoric, even if there might have been, marginally, contacts. In the Arabic tradition, in fact, which is heir on this point to a late Alexandrian tradition, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (and *Poetics*) are part of the *Organon*, in other words they are works of logic. Consequently, it is in the framework of *falsafa* that they are commented on, like the other works of the First Master, by the great *falāsifa*: al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Ibn Ruṣhd (d. 595/1198) (Aouad 1989, Black 1990, Würsch 1991). Which is not to say that “Hellenizing” works of poetics or rhetoric cannot be found even outside *falsafa* (see for an

overview Larcher 1998a): for the classical period and the Mashriq, we may mention the *Naqd al-shi'r* (“criticism of poetry”) of Qudāma ibn Ja‘far (d. 337/948?) and the *Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān* of Ibn Wahb (4th/10th century), at first published under the title *Naqd al-nathr* (“criticism of prose”) and falsely attributed to Qudāma; for the postclassical period and the Maghreb, the *Minhāj al-bulaghā’ wa-sirāj al-udabā’* of Hāzim al-Qartajannī (d. 684/1285), which is actually, despite its title, a Hellenizing work of poetics, studied as such by Heinrichs (1969).

But logic (*mantiq*) having become in the 11th century a scholastic discipline, the entire Arabic tradition knows *al-khaṭāba* and *al-shi'r* as excessively abbreviated names for the rhetorical syllogism (*al-qiyās al-khaṭābī*), i.e., enthymeme, and the poetic syllogism (*al-qiyās al-shi'rī*), that is, premisses that are not merely “uncertain” (*ghayr yaqīniyya*) but actually “producers of imagination” (*mukhayyila*) (on the poetic syllogism see Schoeler 1983). This clearly shows the double reduction undergone by Aristotelian rhetoric in passing from the Greek world to the Muslim world and, within that, from *falsafa* to scholasticism. We may note meanwhile the existence in *falsafa* of a specific development: the theory of the “prophet-legislator.” We may also mention the criticism of the rhetoric and poetics of the philosophers (*mutafalsifūn*) made by Ibn al-Athīr in the *Mathal al-sā'ir* (I, 310–312), who quotes the *Shifā'* of Ibn Sīnā.

Typologically, there are big differences between *‘ilm al-balāgha* and Greek rhetoric. Two deserve attention. Greek rhetoric, it is said, is an oratorical art. The *‘ilm al-balāgha*, in contrast, does not deal with a specific genre, but with all. This explains that the poetics of Sakkākī only deals with strictly technical aspects (meter and rhyme) of poetry. The rest, that is, the basics, the stylistic and thematic aspects, are a matter for *‘ilm al-balāgha* as they are for the other genres. Even the works that appear to be dedicated to specific genres, such as the *Kitāb al-ṣinā'atayn fī-l-kiṭāba wa-l-shi'r* (“The book of the two arts: the art of the secretary of the chancellery and poetry”) of Abū Hilāl al-‘Askarī (d. after 395/1005) actually deal with all of them. Greek rhetoric defines itself as an “art of persuasion,” in other words places at its heart *perlocutionary* acts (Austin 1962). Conversely, the *‘ilm al-balāgha*, via the concept of *‘inshā'*, places at its heart *illocutionary* acts.

This double difference is easily explained if one “recontextualizes” Greek rhetoric and *‘ilm al-balāgha*. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is intimately linked to the judicial and political institutions of Athens, exactly, moreover, as his *Poetics* is linked to the cultural institutions (theater) of the Attic city. Not one of these institutions exists in the Islamic *umma*. On the other hand, it places one “word” above all the others, which it respects as the word of Allah (*kalām Allāh*), “revealed” (*tanzīl*) to Muḥammad, “transmitted” (*tablīgh*) by him, and transcribed in the Quran. Its addressee is not a spectator, who praises and blames, as in the ceremonial genre of Aristotelian rhetoric, and still less a judge to be persuaded, as in the

judicial and deliberative genres of the same. But, once persuaded, he is in fact an interpreter. We are now approaching the hermeneutical side of the *‘ilm al-balāgha*.

Let us note, however, that there exists, in the world of Islam, a form of institutionalized eloquence: this is the sermon (*kuthba*) that the preacher (*khaṭīb*) gives in the pulpit (*minbar*) on Fridays. His art, which is oratory, obviously bears the same name as Aristotle’s *Rhetoric: al-khaṭāba*. This homonymy is the source of much confusion among scholars with insufficient cultural background. To avoid confusion, we call the first, with Heinrichs (1987), “philosophical” rhetoric, and the second, with Larcher (1998), homiletics (for an overview of which see Halldén 2005, 2006 and, for the *khuṭba* in Jāhiz, Soudan 1992, Avril 1994).

8.3. INTERSECTIONS

8.3.1. *‘Ilm al-balāgha* and *‘i’jāz*

As the title of one of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s works reminds us, rhetoric is here included in a specifically Islamic context, where it has an apologetic aim: to “prove” (*dalā’il*) “the inimitability of the Quran” (*‘i’jāz al-Qur’ān*). The *‘i’jāz al-Qur’ān* has become the object of a considerable literature, among which the most famous work is that of Bāqillānī (d. 403 or 404/1013). As a result, it has also become the object of a considerable literature on the part of Arabists (s.v. *‘i’jāz* in *EF* and Inimitability in *EQ*, Audebert 1982). Everything that is necessary and sufficient to know on the subject will be found there. The *‘i’jāz al-Qur’ān* was not definitively established as dogma until the 4th/10th century. Its basis is the verses of the Quran called “challenge” (*tahaddūt*: 10:39; 11:16; 17:90), in which the adversaries of Muḥammad are challenged to produce something similar to the Quran (*min mithlihi*), what in technical terms is called a *mu‘ārada* or “replica.” The fact that the challenge was not met proves the “miraculous” (*mu‘jiz*) character of the Quran, lit. “it renders incapable” of a replica, in other words leaves its adversaries speechless. The concept is thus clearly polemical. As often in Arabic, the term that designates it is only the most important of a series of collocations. It is the collocation and not the term itself that European languages interpret with the word “inimitability (of the Quran).” The *mithli* of the Quranic text can be interpreted as “similar to the Quran, from the point of view of *ma’nā* and/or *lafẓ*.” As a result, we distinguish a “thematic” *‘i’jāz* from a “stylistic” *‘i’jāz*. It is this last that has prevailed. The link between *‘i’jāz* and *balāgha* (as a quality) is recognized by Rummānī (d. 384/994), the author of one of the first works on the subject that we have: “what is at the highest degree of *balāgha* is *mu‘jiz* and it has to do with the *balāgha* of the Quran” (ان ما كان في أعلاها (طبقات))

(البلاغة) معجز وهو بلاغة القرآن.² As a result, a significant advance was made in the domain of *balāgha*, i.e. rhetoric. The close connection between rhetoric, in its two basic components, and literature of the *'i'jāz* did not escape Ibn Khaldūn, even though he, writing long after, attempted to put the relationship in the opposite order (*Muqaddima*, 1068):

The fruit of this discipline is understanding of the inimitability of the Quran. This consists in the fact that the (language of the Quran) indicates all the requirements of the situations (referred to), whether they are stated or understood. This is the highest stage of speech. In addition, (the Quran) is perfect in choice of words and excellence of arrangement and combination. (tr. Rosenthal, abr. ed. 437)

واعلم أن ثمرة هذا الفن إنما هي فهم الإعجاز من القرآن لأنَّ إعجازه في وفاء الدلالة منه بجميع مقتضيات الأحوال منطوقة ومفهومة وهي أعلى مراتب الكمال مع الكلام فيما يختص بالألفاظ في انتقائها وجوده رصفها وتركيبها

8.3.2. *Ilm al-balāgha and tafsīr*

Immediately after Ibn Khaldūn's discussion of relation between rhetoric and the *'i'jāz al-Qur'ān*, he adds (*Muqaddima*, 1068): “This discipline is needed most by Qur'ān commentators” (وأحوج ما يكون إلى هذا الفن المفسرون). But he says, “Most ancient commentators (*tafāsīr*) disregarded it, until Jār-Allāh az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) appeared” to provide a detailed rhetorical commentary on the Quran. Ibn Khaldūn does not conceal his admiration for this commentary, but he is embarrassed by the fact that its author is catalogued as “heterodox” (*'ahl al-bida'*), hence his rejection by most of the “orthodox” (*'ahl al-sunna*). He then devotes the entire rest of the chapter on rhetoric to a justification of being at the same time both perfectly “orthodox” and a reader of Zamakhsharī, taking into account the profit that can be drawn from his work for this discipline overall and the *'i'jāz al-Qur'ān* in particular. In the process, Ibn Khaldūn implicitly reminds us that Zamakhsharī was a Mu'tazilite and that Mu'tazilism, condemned for its thesis called “Qur'ān created (by Allah)” (vs. “uncreated,” i.e. eternal), nonetheless played a considerable role in the elaboration of the dogma of the *'i'jāz al-Qur'ān* and, as a result, of the development, but also of the reorientation, of rhetorical studies. If we now turn to the actual introduction that Zamakhsharī wrote to his commentary, we see that he unequivocally adumbrates his point of view. Reviewing all the Quranic specialists, both by background –jurist (*faqīh*), theologian (*mutakallim*), narrative expert (*hāfiẓ al-qīṣaṣ wa-l-'akhbār*), preacher (*wā'iẓ*)– and by form –grammarians (*naḥwī*), lexicographer (*luḡhawī*)– he concludes that (*Kashshāf*, 16):

² Quoted by Ahmad Saqr in the introduction (11) to his edition of the *I'jāz al-Qur'ān* of Bāqillānī.

There is no one among them who can present himself to follow the [Qur'ānic] ways nor anyone who can throw himself into [Qur'ānic] realities, other than a man who has excelled in two specific Qur'ānic sciences, namely the science of the *ma'ānī* and the science of the *bayān*.

لا يتصدى منه أحد لسلوك تلك الطرائق ولا يجوز على شيء من تلك الحقائق إلا رجل قد برع في علمين
مختصين بالقران وهما علم المعاني وعلم البيان

Here we see an occurrence of the expression, repeated exactly on p. 20, *'ilmā l-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*, which *EL* (s.v. *al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*) claims first appeared in Sakkākī, nearly a century later. And we also see that, in Zamakhsharī's view, there is no rhetoric but Quranic....

8.3.3. *Ilm al-balāgha*, *ilm al-fiqh*, and *ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*

Less well-known are the relationships between linguistic and juridical disciplines. They are, nonetheless, perfectly well recognized by Ibn Khaldūn, in a general way in the passage quoted in the Introduction above and in a specific way in another passage of the *Muqaddima* (61). Wishing to distinguish *khavar*, in the historical sense (the plural *'akhbār* is one of the words for history in Arabic) from *khavar* in the juridical sense (in this sense *khavar* is a synonym of *ḥadīth*), he articulates the difference by means of the linguistic opposition *khavar/ 'inshā'*: the historical *khavar* is a statement, true or false, but “most legal *'akhbār* are performative prescriptions that the Legislator made it obligatory to put into practice”

معظمها (الأخبار الشرعية) تكاليف انشائية أوجب الشاري العمل بها
(Larcher, 1993).

The *khavar* or *ḥadīth* constitutes in fact, after the Quran, the second of the “sources” (*uṣūl*) of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) in Islam. It takes its name from the fact that it transmits the Sunna, that is, the entirety of what was said, done, or endorsed by Muḥammad. This transmission takes the following form: *'akbharanī* (or *ḥaddathanī*) *fulān 'an fulān 'an fulān ... qāl ...* (“So-and-so told me after So-and-so, who had it from So-and-so ..., as follows: ...”). But since most of what is transmitted consists of speech, the term *ḥadīth* itself has become synonymous with “said” by Muḥammad.

Of course, if one is interested in the mechanism of juridical interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna, one soon discovers that it is rhetoric, in the sense defined above –that is, pragmatics. The *uṣūliyyūn*, moreover, do not speak of the utterance (*kalām*), but of the address (*khiṭāb*). The *khiṭāb*, for the case where one might not have understood, is defined by the encyclopedist Kafawī (d. 1094/1683) as “the utterance oriented toward another, in order to cause to understand” (*al-kalām al-muwajjah naḥw al-ghayr li-l-'ifhām*) (*Kulliyāt*, s.v. *khiṭāb*). *'Ifhām* is a direct echo of *mafḥūm* (vs. *manṭūq*), the name for implicit (vs. explicit) meaning

among the *'uṣūliyyūn*, which we met in 8.3.1 in the quotation from Ibn Khaldūn: the juridical meaning of the utterance (Quranic verse or saying of Muḥammad) becomes “intelligible” only when one considers the utterance not for itself, but as an “address” from the Legislator (Allah or his prophet) to the faithful Muslim, who in this context is called *mukallaḥ*.

Likewise, whereas the other disciplines divide the utterance into *khābar* and non-*khābar*, the *'uṣūliyyūn* divide the address into *ṭalab* and non-*ṭalab*, sign of the preeminence of the former over the latter. According to the *'Iḥkām* (I, p. 91) of 'Āmidī (d. 631/1233), the *ṭalab*, according to which he “imposes (*'iqtidā'*) to “do” (*fi'l*) or “not do” (*tark*), “categorically” (*jāzim*) or “uncategorically” (*ghayr jāzim*), is realized as “obligation” (*'ijāb*) and “prohibition” (*tahrīm*), “recommendation” (*nadb*) and “condemnation” (*karāhiya*). The non-*ṭalab* either “gives the choice” (*takhyīr*) between doing and not doing (it is a “permission” *'ibāḥa*) or “declares” (*ikhbār*) that such a thing is valid or not, cause, condition, or obstacle to some other, “to become a (rigorous) duty” (*'azīma*) or “tolerance” (*rukḥṣa*) (Weiss 1992, Larcher 1992).

These six legislative acts (*shar'*) constitute the *'ahkām shar'iyya* (that is, standards), “prescriptive” (*taklīfiyya*) for the first five and “ascriptive” (*wad'iyya*) for the sixth (Kafawī, *Kulliyāt*, s.v. *khiṭāb*). Just one example: *al-ṣalāt wājiba* (“the canonic prayer is obligatory”) is the *ḥukm shar'ī* that can be derived from a Quranic utterance such as *'aqim/ 'aqīmū l-ṣalāta* (“complete [sg./pl.] the prayer”), which is linguistically an “order” (*'amr*), “rendering obligatory,” juridically, this act.

The “prescriptive” *ahkām shar'iyya* –the most important– are organized, as we have just seen, on two levels: the *ṭalab* and the *takhyīr*. But the *ṭalab* level is in turn organized as a “logic square” of deontic modalities: *wājib* (“obligatory (to do)”) and *ḥarām* (“forbidden,” understood as obligatory to not do) are opposites; *mandūb* (“recommended (to do)”) and *makrūh* (“reprehensible,” understood as recommended to not do) are subcontraries. Thus, *wājib* and *ḥarām* imply *mandūb* and *makrūh* while *wājib* and *makrūh*, on the one hand, and *ḥarām* and *mandūb*, on the other, are in a relation of contradiction. If we add that the *takhyīr* is understood as the disjunction “do or not do” and, as a result, the modality that follows from it, that of “permission” (*'ibāḥa*), as bilaterally permission to do or not do, the *'ahkām shar'iyya* must not be represented on a linear axis, from good to bad, but as an inverted pyramid (Kalinowski 1976). The four quadrants represent the modalities that are a matter of *ṭalab*, the point is the *mubāḥ*, and the edges are the relations between it and them (Larcher 1992). Obviously the agreement in number (five) of the *'ahkām shar'iyya* “prescriptions” among the *'uṣūliyyūn*, and the species of *ṭalab* among the rhetoricians, has been noted. The connection between *ṭalab* and *takhyīr* among the former finds its parallel among the latter (*Talkhīṣ*, 169): “the form introduced for an order can be used for something else, such as permission, thus ‘Sit beside al-Hasan or Ibn Sīrīn’”

وقد تستعمل لغيره كالأباحة نحو جالس الحسن أو ابن سيرين

That is not the only influence of logic. From primary standards, derived pragmatically, can be derived secondary ones, logically, i.e., by reasoning (*qiyās*), another source of jurisprudence (at least for those juridical schools that recognize it). Juridical logic has often been distinguished from the logic of logicians by the type of reasoning that is at the heart of each (analogy vs. syllogism), but forgetting that in Arabic they are homonyms. In the postclassical period, the *'uṣūl al-fiqh* recuperated syllogistics but distorted it, as is shown by the following very well known example: *al-nabīdh muskir* (“wine is an intoxicating beverage”); *kull muskir ḥarām* (“every intoxicating beverage is forbidden”); *al-nabīdh ḥarām* (“wine is forbidden”). What makes the specificity of this syllogism is not its form. If we refer to the logical part, and one cannot get more classic than this, of the *Miftāḥ* of Sakkākī, we will confirm that this is a syllogism of the first figure, one of the two affirmative modes, the analogue of our *Darii* (except that, following the Arab tradition, the minor premise is stated before the major). What creates its specificity is that it links descriptive and prescriptive utterances: the character as a standard of the major premise (which is a “saying” of Muḥammad) and of the conclusion is attested by the fact that *x is ḥarām* (“x is forbidden”) can be replaced by the performative *ḥarramtū x* (“I forbid x”), see 'Āmidī, *Iḥkām*, I:12 and IV:48 (on juridical logic see *EF* s.v. *Mantiq*, Brunschvig 1970, Weiss 1992, Larcher 1992, Hallaq 1994).

Indeed, *fa'altu* is the most usual form of juridical performatives, the *siyagh al-'uqūd wa-l-fusūkh* (“contractual and renunciative formulas”) of the Arab tradition, that is, utterances used to tie or untie juridical bonds. It suffices, to be persuaded, to open one of the great treatises of *fiqh* of the postclassical period, such as the *Badā'i'* of Kāsānī (d. 587/1189). These treatises are organized in two parts: *al-'ibādāt* (“worship”), governing the duties of the believer toward the divinity, and *al-mu'āmalāt* (“transactions”), governing relations among individuals. In this last part, for example in the book of contracts (*al-buyū'*) or the chapter on repudiation (*ṭalāq*) or manumission (*i'tāq*), it is confirmed that the performatives of these acts are in order of priority of occurrence: *bi'tu* (“I sell”) and *ishtaraytu* (“I buy”), *ṭallaqtu-ki* (“I repudiate you”), *'a'ṭaqtuka* or *ḥarrartuka* (“I manumit you or I free you”), etc.

8.3.4. A *balāgha* integrated into *nahw*: Raḍī al-dīn al-Astarābādī

All this is found in grammar itself, in particular in the *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* of Astarābādī (Larcher 1990, 1992, 1998b, 2000, 2007). As its title indicates, it is actually a commentary on the *Kāfiya*, a brief introduction (*muqaddima*) to syntax, by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249). Ibn al-Ḥājib was also a Malekite *'uṣūlī*, author of two works on the matter, the *Muntahā* and the

Mukhtaṣar, the latter the object of many commentaries. Ibn al-Ḥājjib seems moreover to be the first grammarian to make explicit use of the category of *'inshā'*. But although he was *'usūlī*, Ibn al-Ḥājjib did not truly make *'inshā'* a self-referential and performative conception. He conceived it more readily as the subjective mode of discourse (as opposed to the *khavar*, objective mode), or again, semiotically, as the mode of signifying “expression” (*Ausdruck*) a psychological event that the statement “represents” (*Darstellung*), using an opposition due to Karl Bühler (1879–1963). In this last conception, one does not state one’s intention, one “signals” (*tanbīh*) it. This is the term, coupled with *'inshā'* in his successors, that in the *Mahsul* (I, 1, 317–318) of Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) designates utterances that are neither statements nor requests. Conversely, Astarābādī, although he was a logician, is not at all a logicist. He dedicates considerable space to the category of *'inshā'*. If we gather all the passages where he mentions it, we can actually extract from the *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* a veritable “pragmatic theory.” It appears as a diptych, where the category of *'inshā'* constitutes the conceptual panel and the performative *fa'altu* the formal panel. The elementary propositions can be stated as follows:

(1) *Kalām* is everything the utterance of which constitutes an “act of the utterer” (*fi'l al-mutakallim*).

The priority given to the semantico-pragmatic criterion over the formal criterion (*jumla*) first of all permits Astarābādī to understand the category of *'inshā'* as the totality of utterances. He uses *'inshā'* in two ways: both in opposition to *khavar* and *ṭalab* as the specific name of the juridical performative (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, I, 8); and in opposition to *khavar* alone as the generic name for nondeclarative utterances, but subdividing them into *ṭalabī* (“requesting, demanding”) and *'iqa'ī* (“operatives” = juridical performatives) (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, II, 221). This double classification confirms that the category of *'inshā'* is indeed the product of a generalization from performatives that are both explicit and juridical. But he also continues a reflection that was begun by Ibn al-Ḥājjib on mixed utterances, of the exclamatory type, “susceptible of being both assertive and performative” (*yahtamil al-'ikhbār wa-l-'inshā'*) (*'Amālī* IV, 149–150), and then was continued by Ibn Mālik under the name *khavar 'inshā'ī* (*Sharḥ al-Tashīl* III, 33). Astarābādī gathers them under the name *'inshā' juz'u-hu l-khavar* (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* II, 93 and 311). There one finds the *kam* called “assertive” (“How ...!”), as opposed to the interrogative *kam* (“How ...?”), *rubba* (“A little of ...!”), the “verbs of praise and blame” (*'af'āl al-madh wa-l-dhamm*), and the “verb of admiration” (*fi'l al-ta'ajjub*). Astarābādī thus opens the door to the interpretation of the “element” (*juz'*) *khavar*, not as posited, but as presupposed. This interpretation is made explicitly, in the commentary in the margin (*Hāshiya*) of the *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* (II, 311), by his own commentator 'Alī b. Muhammad al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) under the name *lāzim 'urfī* (“empirical implication”).

This last thus characterizes the element *Zaydun ḥasanun* (“Zayd is good”) in relation to the performative of “admiration” *mā ’aḥsana Zaydan* (“How good Zayd is!”).

Furthermore, Astarābādhī turns to ascriptive statements, of the type *Zaydun ’afḍalu min ’Amrin* (“Zayd is superior to ’Amr”). He says in fact that the uttering of this declaration performs an act of *tafḍīl*. His own commentator (*Ḥāshiyā*, in *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, II, 311) defines this not as “to make superior” (*ja ’lu-hu ’afḍal*), but as “to call superior” (*al-’ikhbār ’an kawnihi ’afḍal*). In other words, he gives the verb *faḍḍala*, of which *tafḍīl* is the *maṣḍar*, not a “factive” interpretation, but, following the terminology of the French linguist Emile Benveniste (1902–1976), “delocutive” (Benveniste 1958). Astarābādhī finally arrives at purely *descriptive* statements, of the type *Zaydun qā’imun* (“Zayd is standing”), of which he says that the utterance performs an act of assertion (*’ikhbār*).

The same criterion, of *kalām* defined by the act of the utterer, moreover allows Astarābādhī to extend the very concepts of *kalām* and *’inshā’* both below and beyond the classical “utterance” defined formally as *jumla*.

Below, as in the case of the *’asmā’ al-’af’āl*. This is what the Arabic grammarians call “nouns”, the “denominal of which (*musammā*) are verbs, in other words have the same semantic value as them, and which correspond to what we in our tradition call interjections. But whereas the other grammarians paraphrase *’uff* (“Bah!”) and *’awwah* (“Alas!”) with *’atadajjaru* (“I am disgusted”) and *’atawajja ’u* (“I am distressed”), which they consider to be statements, Astarābādhī paraphrases them with *tadajjartu* and *tawajja ’tu*, which are explicitly called *’inshā’* (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* II, 65).

Beyond, as in the case of the pragmatic connectives *p lākinna q* and *p ’inna q*, where *p* and *q* are utterances. Of the first (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, II, 346), Astarābādhī says that “in *lākinna*, there is the sense of *istadraktu*” (*wa-ft lākinna ma ’nā istadraktu*). He describes it using the example *jā’anī Zaydun lākinna ’Amran lam yaji* (“Zayd came to me, but [as for] ’Amr, did not come”), as carrying out an act of preemptive rectification (*istidrāk*) by *q*, of the false conclusion *r* (“thus ’Amr came also”) that is in danger of being drawn from *p* by the hearer, who is aware of the close relationship between Zayd and ’Amr. Of the second (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, II, 349), Astarābādhī says that “placed in the middle of a *kalām*, but being the beginning of a new *kalām*” (*kāna ft waṣṭ kalām lākinnaḥu ibtidā’ kalām ’ākhar*), for example *’akrim Zaydan ’innahu fāḍil* (“Honor Zayd: (for) he has merit”), he presents a “justification” (*’illa*) of *p* by *q*. In other words, for him, there are here three *kalām*: the two *utterances p* and *q* and the *discourse p ’inna q*. The justification, like preemptive rectification, is an act of the utterer, which operate not at the level of the utterance, but at the level of discourse – that is, of the articulation of the utterances among themselves. We may observe that Astarābādhī calls *’inna-hu fāḍil* a “*kalām musta’naḥ*” (“resumption”), very certainly in the sense of the rhetoricians (cf. 8.2.2.4), that is, constituting an answer to the implicit question suggested by

the preceding utterance: “I say to you *p*. You are going to ask me why. I answer you *q*.” The very etymology of French *car* (“for”) (< Lat. *quare* “why?”) confirms the movement.

(2) This “act of the utterer” can be represented by a performative *fa’altu*.

Formally, this is a *jumla*. But if we adopt the formalism of the linguistic philosophers (Searle 1969), namely $F(p)$, where F is an illocutionary force and p a proposition, *fa’altu* obviously represents F and not p , a *modus*, not a *dictum*. We might just as well adopt the formalism of the logicians, namely $f(x)$, where f is a function and x the argument that this function is going to saturate. If, then, we assimilate F to f , the illocutionary force to a function, *fa’altu* appears in the following cases: (1) it is a function that is not going to saturate any explicit argument: this is the case for interjections, which constitute a comment on an implicit topic; and (2) it is a function whose argument is (a) a term n : this is the case of the vocative, or (b) the term n of an incomplete proposition: this is the case of exclamations, or (c) a proposition p : this is the case of classical utterances, or (d) two or more explicit or implicit utterances: this is the case of pragmatic connectives.

(3) This representation is either purely semantic or semantico-syntactic, according to whether it does not or contrariwise does play a role in the derivation of sentences.

It plays no role in the case of interjections or pragmatic connectives. To say that *’uff* or *’awwah* has the meaning of *tadajjartu* or *tawajja ’tu*, called *’inshā’ī*, in effect says that these expressions really have as their meaning a behavior (*tadajjar-*, *tawajja -*) of the one who speaks (*-tu*), but that this behavior is not asserted, but “played” by the utterance of the interjection. It does, on the other hand, play one in the case of the vocative *yā Zaydu* (“Zayd!”), which Astarābādhī derives from *nadaytu/da’awdu Zaydan* (“I call Zayd”) (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, I, 132). This derivation makes the vocative, on the syntactic level, look like the object complement of an understood verb: the grammarians argue that the vocative always has the marker of the accusative, except in the case illustrated by *yā Zaydu*, that is, in the case where it refers to an expression that is both simple (*mufrad*) and definite (*ma’rifa*) and where an undecidable ending (*-u*) appears. The best grammarians themselves recognize that this representation is not entirely satisfactory on the semantic level: it conceals the fact that the vocative transforms a term of reference into a term of address. Whence the remark that this verb is necessarily understood and cannot appear, replaced as it is by the particle *yā*. It also plays a role in the case of *Zaydun qā’imun ḥaqqan* “Zayd is standing, truly,” which Astarābādhī derives from *qultu Zaydun qā’imun qawlan ḥaqqan* “I say ‘Zayd is standing’ with a true saying” (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, I, 124). This derivation makes *ḥaqqan* appear, on the

syntactic level, as the “resultative complement” (*maf‘ūl muṭlaq*), of the “specificatory” type (*li-bayān al-naw’*), of an understood verb, which justifies its accusative inflection. And it makes it appear, on the semantic level, as qualifying the speech act (the act of assertion) as veridical, and not the thing said (the fact declared) as true, in other words the equivalent of a sentence adverb, but with enunciative effect.

(4) Finally, this representation is abstract.

It is abstract in the sense that there does not necessarily exist an explicit performative corresponding to the illocutionary act or that, if it exists, does not necessarily have the form *fa‘altu*. The first case is represented by the paraphrase of the interjections, which, for Astarābādhī, looks like nothing but a pure invention by the grammarians. The second case is represented by the vocative. Whereas Ibn Mālik understands the verb in the form *’af‘alu*, while considering it a performative (*Sharḥ al-Tashīl* III, p. 385), Astarābādhī prefers explicitly, in this role, the form *fa‘altu*, which he justifies as follows (*Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* I, 132):

The verb has as its object the performance: and therefore it is better to understand it in the form of the past, i.e. *da‘awtu* or *nādaytu*, the performative verbs appearing most often in this form

الفعل المقصود به الانشاء فالأولى أن يقدر بلفظ الماضي أي دعوت أو ناديت لأن الاغلب في الأفعال الانشائية
مجبتها بلفظ الماضي

Fa‘altu is thus chosen for its expressive power and is thus equivalent to a real *formalization*.

8.4. Conclusion

With the grammarian Raḍī al-dīn al-Astarābādhī, we attain an extreme degree of sophistication that has no equivalent anywhere except, perhaps, in posterity, essentially Turko-Irano-Indian, of the *Kāfiya*, the commentators of it keeping an eye on Astarābādhī’s commentary. Its very sophistication militates against and continues to militate against an appreciation of the work. Nonetheless, if, as done here, we contextualize it, we observe that it simply leads in the same direction, but farther than the entire Arab linguistic tradition in the postclassical period: the direction of a strong and original bond, essentially pragmatic in nature, between the various disciplines, entirely or partially linguistic, that constitute this tradition.

References

1. Primary sources

- 'Āmidī, *'Ihkām* = Sayf al-dīn Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-'Āmidī. *Al-'Ihkām fī 'uṣūl al-'aḥkām*. Cairo, Mu'assasat al-Ḥalabī, 1487/1967.
- 'Askarī, *Kitāb al-ṣinā'atayn* = Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan b. 'Abd Allāh b. Sahl al-'Askarī, *Kitāb al-ṣinā'atayn fī l-kitāba wa-l-shi'r*, 1st édition, Istanbul, 1320/1902.
- Astarābādihī, *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya* = Raḍī al-dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Astarābādihī, *Sharḥ Kāfiyat Ibn al-Ḥājib*. 2 vols. Istanbul: Maṭba'at al-sharika al-ṣiḥāfiyya al-'uthmāniyya. 1275/1858 and 1892. [Repr. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, n.d.].
- Badr al-dīn Ibn Mālik, *Miṣbāḥ* = Badr al-dīn Ibn Mālik *al-Miṣbāḥ fī l-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badī'*, ed. Ḥusnī 'Abd al-Jalīl Yūsuf. Cairo: Maktabat al-'Ādāb, 1989.
- Bāqillānī, *'Ijāz* = Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *'Ijāz al-Qur'ān*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, coll. Dhaḥā'ir al-'Arab 12. Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1963.
- Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān* = Abū 'Uthmān 'Amr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 parts in 2 vol., Cairo, Maktabat lajnat al-ta'līf wa-l-tarjama wa-l-nashr, 1367/1948.
- Jurjānī, *'Asrār al-balāgha* = 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, *'Asrār al-balāgha*, ed. Hellmut Ritter, Istanbul, Government Press, 1954.
- Jurjānī, *Dalā'il al-'Ijāz* = 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, *Dalā'il al-'Ijāz fī 'ilm al-ma'ānī*, ed. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā. Beirut: Dār al-ma'rifa, 1402/1982.
- Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiya* = 'Alī b. Muḥammad, dit al-sayyid al-sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya 'alā sharḥ al-kāfiya*, cf. Astarābādihī.
- Khafājī, *Sirr al-faṣāḥa* = Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Sa'īd b. Sinān al-Khafājī al-Ḥalabī, *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*. Cairo: Maktabat Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣubayḥ, 1389/1969.
- Ibn al-'Athīr, *al-Mathal al-sā'ir* = Abū l-Faṭḥ Ḍiyā' al-dīn Naṣr Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-ma'rūf bi-Ibn al-'Athīr al-Mawṣilī, *al-Mathal al-sā'ir fī 'adab al-kātib wa-l-shā'ir*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 1 vol. in 2 parts, Cairo, Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1358/1939.
- Ibn Fāris, *Ṣāhibī* = Abū l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāhibī fī fiqh al-lugha wa-sunan al-'arab fī kalāmihā*, éd. Moustafa El-Chouémi, Coll. Bibliotheca philologica arabica, published under the direction of R. Blachère and J. Abdel-Nour, vol. 1. Beirut : A. Badran & Co. 1383/1964.

- Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima* = Walī l-dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, vol. I of *Kitāb al-‘ibar*. Beirut: Maktabat al-madrasa and Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī, 1967.
- Ibn al-Ḥājib, *‘Amālī* = Jamāl al-dīn Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān b. ‘Umar dit Ibn al-Ḥājib, *al-Amālī al-naḥwiyya*. Ed. Hādī Ḥasan Ḥammūdī. 4 parts in 2 vols. Beirut: ‘Ālam al-kutub and Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1405/1985.
- Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Kāfiya* = *al-Muqaddima al-kāfiya fī l-naḥw*, cf. Astarābādihī.
- Ibn Mālik, *Sharḥ al-Tashīl* = Jamāl al-dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ṭā’ī al-Jayyānī al-Andalusī Ibn Mālik, *Sharḥ al-tashīl*, ed. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān and al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Makhtūn. 4 parts in 2 volumes. Gizeh: Hajr li-ṭibā‘a wa-l-nashr wa-l-tawzī‘ wa-l-’i‘lān, 1410/1990.
- Ibn al-Mu‘tazz, *Kitāb al-badī‘*, ed. Ignatius Kratchkovsky, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Publications, New Series, X, 1935.
- Ibn Rashīq, *‘Umda* = Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan Ibn Rashīq al-Qayrawānī al-’Azdī, *al-‘Umda fī maḥāsīn al-shi‘r wa-’ādābihi wa-naqdihi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. Beirut: Dār al-Ġīl, 1972.
- Ibn Wahb, *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*, ed. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadija al-Ḥadīthī. Baghdad, 1387/1967.
- Kafawī, *Kulliyāt* = Abū al-Baqā’ ‘Ayyūb b. Mūsā al-Ḥusaynī al-Kafawī, *Kulliyāt al-‘ulūm*. Ed. ‘Adnān Darwīsh and Muḥammad al-Maṣrī, 5 vols. Damascus: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1981.
- Kāsānī, *Badā’i‘* = Abū Bakr b. Mas‘ūd al-Kāsānī, *Kitāb Badā’i‘ al-ṣanā’i‘ fī tartīb al-sharā’i‘*, 7 vols. Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Jamāliyya, 1327-1328/1909-1910.
- Qarṭājannī, *Minhāj* = Abū l-Ḥasan Ḥāzīm al-Qarṭājannī, *Minhāj al-bulaghā’ wa-sirāj al-‘udabā’*, ed. Muḥammad al-Ġabīb Ibn al-Ḥawja, 3rd ed. Beirut, Dār al-Gharb al-’islāmī, 1986 [first ed. Tunis, 1966].
- Qazwīnī, *‘Idāḥ* = Jalāl al-dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī, *al-‘Idāḥ fī sharḥ Talḥīṣ al-Miftāḥ*. Cf. *Shurūḥ al-Talḥīṣ*.
- Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ* = Jalāl al-dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ fī ‘ulūm al-balāgha*. Ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Barqūqī. Cairo, al-Maktaba al-tijāriyya al-kubrā, n.d.
- Rāzī, *Maḥṣūl* = Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ‘ulūm ‘uṣūl al-fiqh*. Ed. Ṭaha Jābir Fayyād al-‘Ulwanī. Imām Muḥammad b. Sa‘ūd University, 1399/1979.

Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ* = Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf b. Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-‘ulūm*. Cairo: Matba‘at al-taqaddum al-‘ilmiyya, 1348/1929. [repr. Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, n.d.].

Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ, 4 vols. Cairo: Maṭba‘at ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī. 1937.

Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf* = Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ‘Umar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl wa-‘uyūn al-‘aḳāwīl fī wujūh al-ta’wīl*. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.

2. Secondary sources

Aouad, Maroun. 1989. La *Rhétorique*. Tradition syriaque et arabe. In *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, ed. Richard Goulet, vol. 1, 455–472. Paris: Editions du CNRS.

Arnaldez, A. Mantīq. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l’Islam, new edition*, Vol. 6, 427–38. Leiden: Brill.

Audebert, Claude-France. 1982. *Al-Khaṭṭābī et l’inimitabilité du Coran. Traduction et introduction au Bayān ‘I jāz al-Qur’ān*. Damascus: Institut Français d’Études Arabes.

Austin, John. 1962. *How to do things with words*. London: Oxford University Press.

Avril, Marie-Hélène. 1994. Généalogie de la *khuṭba* dans le *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn* de Jāḥiz. *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 46: 197–216.

Bally, Charles. 1965. *Linguistique générale et linguistique française*, 4th rev. ed. Berne: Francke.

Benveniste, Émile. 1958[1966]. Les verbes délocutifs. In *Studia Philologica et litteraria in honorem L. Spitzer*, ed. Anna G. Hatcher and K.L. Selig, 57–63. Berne: Francke [repr. in *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, I, 277–285. Paris: Gallimard. 1966].

Berrendonner, Alain. 1981. *Éléments de pragmatique linguistique*. Paris: Minit.

Bernard, M. Mu‘āmalāt. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l’Islam, new edition*, 1960-2005, Vol. 7, 25-59. Leiden: Brill.

Black, Deborah L. 1990. *Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic philosophy*. Leiden: Brill.

Bonebakker, S. Ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l’Islam, new edition*, Vol. 5, 904-08. Leiden: Brill.

Brunschvig, Robert. 1970. Logic and law in Classical Islam. In *Logic in Classical Islamic culture*, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum, 9–20. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Buburuzan [Firănescu], Rodica. 1995. Significations des énoncés et actes de langage chez Ibn Fāris. In *Proceedings of the colloquium on Arabic linguistics, Bucharest August 29-September 2, 1994*, vol. 1, 103–114. Bucarest: University of Bucharest, Center for Arab Studies.

- . 2011. Readings notes on Sakkākī's concept of 'semantic engendering'. In *A Festschrift for Nadia Anghelescu*, ed. Andrei A. Avram, Anca Focșeneanu, George Grigore, 215–233. Bucarest: Editura Universității din București.
- Frank, Richard. 1981. Meanings are spoken of in many ways: The earlier Arab grammarians. *Le Muséon* 94: 259–319.
- Ghersetti, Antonella. 1998. Quelques notes sur la définition canonique de *balāgha*. In *Philosophy and arts in the Islamic World, Proceedings of the eighteenth congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants held at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Septembre 3-Septembrer 9, 1996)*, ed. U. Vermeulen et D. De Smet, 57–72. Leuven: Peeters.
- 2002. La définition du *khobar* (énoncé assertif) dans la pensée rhétorique de 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. In *Studies in Arabic and Islam, Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Halle 1998*, ed. S. Leder with H. Kilpatrick, B. Martel-Thoumian and H. Schönig, 367–77. Louvain: Peeters.
- Guillaume, Jean-Patrick. 1986. Sibawayhi et l'énonciation: une proposition de lecture. *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 8: 53–62.
- Hallaq, Wael. 1994. *Law and legal theory in Classical and Medieval Islam*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Halldén, Philip. 2005. What is Arab Islamic rhetoric? Rethinking the history of Muslim oratory, art and homiletics. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37:19–38.
- . 2006. Rhetoric. In *Medieval Islamic Civilization*, ed. Josef Meri, 679–681. New York: Routledge.
- Heinrichs, Wolfhart. 1969. *Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik. Ḥāzīm al-Qarṭājānī's Grundlegung der Poetik mit Hilfe aristotelischer Begriffe*, Beirut Texte und Studien, Band 8. Beirut: Orient Institut & Wiesbaden: Steiner.
- . 1984. On the genesis of the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy. *Studia Islamica* 59: 111–140.
- . 1987. Poetik, Rhetorik, Literaturkritik, Metrik und Reimlehre. In *Grundriss der arabischen Philologie*, Band II *Literaturwissenschaft*, ed. H. Gätje, 177–207. Wiesbaden: Reichert.
- . 1998. Rhetoric and poetics. In *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, ed. Julia Meisami and Paul Starkey, 651–656. London: Routledge.
- Jakobson, Roman. 1956. Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances. In Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle. *Fundamentals of language*, Part II, 55-82. The Hague: Mouton & Co.
- Jenssen, H. 1998. *The subtleties and secrets of the Arabic language. Preliminary investigations into Al-Qazwīnī's Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*. London: Hurst.
- Kalinowski, George. 1976. Un aperçu élémentaire des modalités déontiques. *Langages* 43: 10–18.

- Khalafallah, M. Badī'. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l'Islam, new edition*, Vol. 1, 881-82. Leiden: Brill.
- Larcher, Pierre. 1980. *Information et performance en science arabo-islamique du langage*. PhD diss. Université de Paris III.
- . 1990. Éléments pragmatiques dans la théorie grammaticale arabe post-classique. In *Studies in the History of Arabic Grammar*, vol. 2, ed. Kees Versteegh & Mike Carter, 193–214. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- . 1991. Quand, en arabe, on parlait de l'arabe... (II) Essai sur la catégorie de 'inshā' (vs *khabar*). *Arabica* 38: 246–273.
- . 1992. Quand, en arabe, on parlait de l'arabe... (III) Grammaire, logique, rhétorique dans l'islam postclassique. *Arabica* 39: 358–384.
- . 1993. Les arabisants et la catégorie de 'inshā'. Histoire d'une "occultation". *Historiographia Linguistica* 20: 259–282.
- . 1998a. Éléments de rhétorique aristotélicienne dans la tradition arabe hors la *falsafa*. In *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVIIème siècle* (La Baume lès Aix, 10–12 Juillet 1995), ed. Gilbert Dahan and Irène Rosier-Catach, 241–256. *Traditions de l'Antiquité classique*. Paris: Vrin.
- . 1998b. Une pragmatique avant la pragmatique: "médiévale", "arabe" et "islamique". *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 20: 101–116.
- . 2000. Les relations entre la linguistique et les autres sciences dans la société arabo-islamique. In *History of the language sciences*, vol 1, ed. E. F. K. Koerner, Sylvain Auroux, Hans-Josef Niederehe, Kees Versteegh, 312–318. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. [English translation: Relationships between linguistics and the other sciences in Arabo-islamic society. In *The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition*, ed. Ramzi Baalbaki, 337–348. *The Formation of the Classical Islamic World* 36. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2007].
- . 2007. 'Inshā'. *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, vol. 2, Eg–Lan, 358–361. Brill: Leiden.
- . 2009. Mais qu'est-ce donc que la *balāgha* ?. In *Literary and philosophical rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac and Arabic worlds*, ed. Frédérique Woerther, 197–213. *Europaea Memoria*. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Martin, Richard. 2002. Inimitability. In *The Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*, vol. 2, ed. J. D. McAuliffe, 526-36. Leiden, Brill.
- Mehren, A. 1853[1970]. *Die Rhetorik der Araber*. Kopenhagen: Otto Schwarz & Wien: Kaiserl. Königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei [repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag].
- Montgomery, James. 2006. Al-Jāhīz's *Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn*. In *Writing and representation in Medieval Islam*, ed. Julia Bray, 91–152. *Muslim Horizons*. London: Routledge.

- Moutaouakil, Ahmed. 1982. *Réflexions sur la théorie de la signification dans la pensée linguistique arabe*. Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines.
- 1990. La notion d' 'actes de langage' dans la pensée linguistique arabe ancienne. In *Studies in the history of Arabic Grammar*, vol. 2, ed. Kees Versteegh and Mike Carter, 229–238. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Owens, Jonathan. 1988. *The foundations of grammar: An introduction to Medieval Arabic grammatical theory*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Schaade, A. Balāgha. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l'Islam, new edition*, Vol. 1, 1012-1013. Leiden: Brill.
- Schoeler, Gregor. 1983. Der poetische Syllogismus. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der 'logischen' Poetik der Araber. *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 133: 44–92.
- Searle, John. 1969. *Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 1975. Indirect speech acts. In *Syntax and semantics*, vol. 3, *Speech Acts*, ed. P. Cole and J. L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press.
- Simon, Udo. 1993. *Mittelalterliche arabische Sprachbetrachtung zwischen Grammatik und Rhetorik: 'ilm al-ma'ānī bei as-Sakkākī*. Heidelberg: Heidelberg Orientverlag.
- Smyth, William. 1992. Some quick rules *ut pictura poesis*: the rules for simile in *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm*. *Oriens* 33: 215–229.
- 1993. The making of a textbook. *Studia Islamica* 76: 99–115.
- 1995. The Canonical formulation of 'Ilm al-balāghah and al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm*. *Der Islam* 72: 7–24
- Soudan, Françoise. 1992. L'éloquence arabe aux premiers temps de l'islam d'après le *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn* d'al-Ġāḥiz, *Annales islamologiques* 26:19–46.
- Versteegh, Kees. 2004. Meanings of speech. The category of sentential mood in Arabic grammar. In *Le Voyage et la langue, Mélanges en l'honneur d'Anouar Louca et André Roman*, ed. Joseph Dichy and Hassan Hamzé, 269–287. Damascus: Institut Français du Proche-Orient.
- Von Grunebaum, G. Bayān. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l'Islam, new edition*, Vol. 1, 1147-1150. Leiden: Brill.
- . Faṣāḥa. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l'Islam, new edition*, Vol. 2, 843-846. Leiden: Brill.
- . 'I'jāz. In *Encyclopedia of Islam/Encyclopédie de l'Islam, new edition*, Vol. 3, 1044-1046. Leiden: Brill.
- Weiss, Bernard. 1976. A Theory of the parts of speech in Arabic (Noun, verb and particle). A study in 'ilm al-waḍ'. *Arabica* 23: 23–36.

- . 1992. *The search for Gods law. Islamic jurisprudence in the writings of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Würsch, Renata. 1991. *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antikes Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*. Berlin: Klaus Schwartz Verlag.
- Zysow, Aron. 2008. *Tamannī*. If wishes were...: Notes on wishing in Islamic texts. In *Classical Arabic humanities in their own terms. Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on his 65th birthday presented by his students and colleagues*, ed. Beatrice Gruendler, asst. Michael Cooperson, 522–567. Leiden: Brill. (Trans. from the French Peter Daniels)